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INTERPRETING I.R.C. § 67(e): THE SUPREME COURT’S
ATTEMPT TO NAIL INVESTMENT ADVISORY FEES TO THE
“FLOOR”
Knight v. Commissioner, 128 S. Ct. 782 (2008)
Lindsay Roshkind*
In the process of statutory interpretation, a court must determine
“whether the language at issue has a plain and unambiguous meaning with
regard to the particular dispute in the case. [The court’s] inquiry must
cease if the statutory language is unambiguous and the statutory scheme
is coherent and consistent.”1 To determine the amount of an estate or
trust’s taxable income, Internal Revenue Code § 63 provides “the term
‘taxable income’ means gross income minus the deductions allowed by
this chapter.”2 However, even if a deduction is allowed, § 67(a) may limit
the amount of the deduction.3 Section 67(a) provides “miscellaneous
itemized deductions for any taxable year shall be allowed only to the
extent that the aggregate of such deductions exceeds 2 percent of adjusted
gross income.”4 This 2% limitation is commonly referred to as the 2%
floor. Section 67(e) exempts from the 2% floor “deductions for costs
which are paid or incurred in connection with the administration of the
estate or trust and which would not have been incurred if the property were
not held in such trust or estate.”5 Such deductions are not limited and are
fully deductible to determine the taxable income of an estate or trust under
§ 63.6
In the instant case,7 the Petitioner, trustee of a testamentary trust, hired
an institutional investment management firm to provide advice about

* L.L.M. in Taxation anticipated 2009, J.D. 2008, University of Florida Levin College of
Law; B.B.A. 2005, The George Washington University. I would like to thank Professor Dennis
Calfee, Daniel Glassman, Kristeen Witt and Scott Bowman for reading and editing multiple drafts
of this Comment and providing me with valuable criticism and ideas. I would also like to thank my
family and friends for their continued love and support. Your inspiration and encouragement are
always appreciated.
1. Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 340 (1997) (internal quotation marks and
citation omitted).
2. I.R.C. § 63(a) (2000).
3. See id. § 67(a).
4. Id.
5. Id. § 67(e)(1).
6. See §§ 63, 67(e).
7. Knight v. Comm’r, 128 S. Ct. 782 (2008).
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investing the trust’s assets.8 In 2000, the trust paid the firm $22,241 in
investment advisory fees.9 On the trust’s fiduciary income tax return for
2000, the trust deducted in full the investment advisory fees paid to the
firm.10 After conducting an audit, the Commissioner of the Internal
Revenue Service determined that the investment advisory fees were
“miscellaneous itemized deductions subject to the 2% floor” of § 67(a).11
Therefore, the Commissioner allowed the trust to deduct only the
investment advisory fees that exceeded 2% of the trust’s adjusted gross
income for 2000, resulting in a tax deficiency of $4,448.12
The Petitioner sought review of the assessed deficiency in the United
States Tax Court, arguing that the Petitioner’s fiduciary duty to act as a
“prudent investor” required the Petitioner to obtain investment advisory
services, and therefore to pay investment advisory fees.13 Petitioner argued
that such fees are unique to trusts and therefore should be fully deductible
by reason of § 67(e)(1).14 The Tax Court rejected this argument, finding
that only costs not commonly incurred outside the administration of trusts
are fully deductible under § 67(e)(1).15 Therefore, the Tax Court held that
because investment advisory fees were costs commonly incurred outside
the administration of trusts, they were deductible only to the extent that
they exceeded 2% of the trust’s adjusted gross income pursuant to
§ 67(a).16
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the Tax Court’s
judgment, concluding that to determine whether investment advisory fees
are fully deductible or subject to the 2% floor of § 67(a), “the statutory
language directs the inquiry toward the counterfactual condition of assets
held individually instead of in trust,” and “demands . . . an objective
determination of whether the particular cost is one that is peculiar to trusts
and one that individuals are incapable of incurring.”17 Therefore, the
Second Circuit held that the investment advisory fees were subject to the
8. Id. at 786. The trust held approximately $2.9 million in marketable securities. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id. Additionally, the trust reported total income of $624,816. Id.
11. Id.; § 67(a). See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
12. Knight, 128 S. Ct. at 786. In 2000, the trust had no miscellaneous itemized deductions
other than the investment advisory fees in dispute. Id.
13. Id. The Petitioner argued he had a duty to act as a “prudent investor” under the
Connecticut Uniform Prudent Investor Act. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 45a-541a (West 2008).
14. Id.; § 67(e) provides in relevant part that “the adjusted gross income of an estate or trust
shall be computed in the same manner as in the case of an individual, except that . . . the deductions
for costs which are paid or incurred in connection with the administration of the estate or trust and
which would not have been incurred if the property were not held in such trust or estate . . . shall
be treated as allowable” and not subject to the 2% floor in § 67(a). § 67(e)(1).
15. Rudkin Testamentary Trust v. Comm’r, 124 T.C. 304, 310–11 (2005).
16. Id. at 311.
17. Rudkin Testamentary Trust v. Comm’r, 467 F.3d 149, 151, 155–56 (2006).
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2% floor because the fees were “costs of a type that could be incurred if
the property were held individually rather than in trust.”18
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari,19 recognizing the
need to resolve the conflict among the circuit courts.20 The Court affirmed
the Second Circuit,21 and HELD that § 67(e)(1) exempts from the 2% floor
of § 67(a) only those costs incurred by a trust that would be uncommon (or
unusual or unlikely) for a hypothetical individual to incur and because
investment advisory fees are not such uncommon costs, they are subject
to the 2% floor of § 67(a).22
The language of § 67(e) begins with a general proposition: “For
purposes of this section, the adjusted gross income of an estate or trust
shall be computed in the same manner as in the case of an
individual . . . .”23 This means estates and trusts compute their adjusted
gross income by deducting costs subject to the same 2% floor that applies
to individuals.24 However, the general proposition is followed by an
exception that applies when two conditions are met. First, the cost must be
“paid or incurred in connection with the administration of the estate or
trust.”25 Second, the cost must be one “which would not have been
18. Id. at 155–56.
19. Knight, 128 S. Ct. at 787.
20. Id. at 786–87.
21. Id. at 787.
22. Id. at 790–91. While this Comment generally refers to trusts, the analysis applies equally
to estates. See id. at 785 n.1.
23. I.R.C. § 67(e) (2000). An individual’s “adjusted gross income” is calculated first by
determining “gross income” under § 61. Section 61(a) defines “gross income” as “all income from
whatever source derived.” “Adjusted gross income” is then calculated by subtracting from gross
income certain “above-the-line” deductions listed in § 62. “Taxable income” is then calculated by
subtracting from “adjusted gross income” the itemized or “below-the-line” deductions consisting
of all deductions other than “above-the-line” deductions listed in § 62 and the “personal exemption”
under § 151. See § 63. The majority of “itemized deductions” are “miscellaneous itemized
deductions.” See § 67 (defining miscellaneous itemized deductions). Section 67(a) provides
“miscellaneous itemized deductions for any taxable year shall be allowed only to the extent that
the aggregate of such deductions exceeds 2 percent of adjusted gross income.” Section 67(b)
defines “miscellaneous itemized deductions” as itemized deductions other than the deductions listed
under § 67(b). Investment advisory fees are deductible under § 212. Section 212 allows a deduction
for “all the ordinary and necessary expenses paid or incurred during the taxable year (1) for the
production or collection of income; [or] (2) for the management, conservation, or maintenance of
property held for the production of income.” Because § 212 is not listed under § 67(b) as a fully
deductible cost, it is a “miscellaneous itemized deduction” and subject to the 2% floor in § 67(a).
See Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.67-1T(a) (2008). Therefore, investment advisory fees would be exempt
from the 2% floor of § 67(a) only if § 67(e) applies. However, see infra notes 127–33 discussing
possible argument that § 212 is not applicable by operation of § 263.
24. Knight, 128 S. Ct. at 787.
25. § 67(e)(1). “The first [condition], standing alone, would exempt all administration
expenses from the 2 percent rule.” Dennis I. Belcher, et al., Recent Developments—2007, 42ND
ANNUAL HECKERLING INST. ON ESTATE PLANNING, UNIV. OF MIAMI SCH. OF LAW 173 (2008).
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incurred if the property were not held in such trust or estate.”26 The
conflict between the circuits over the application of § 67(e) before Knight
revolved around the interpretation of the second condition.
In O’Neill v. Commissioner,27 the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals
attempted to interpret the intent of § 67(e).28 Appellees, co-trustees of an
irrevocable trust, appealed the Tax Court’s decision that the investment
advisory fees paid by the trust were expenses subject to the 2% floor of
§ 67(a) and therefore deductible only to the extent that they exceeded 2%
of the trust’s adjusted gross income.29 On de novo review, the court of
appeals reversed and directed judgment on behalf of the trust.30 The court
acknowledged that “[a] trustee is charged with the responsibility to invest
and manage trust assets as a ‘prudent investor’ would manage his own
assets.”31 While a state may provide a “‘detailed list of pre-approved
investments,’” the court stated “the mere selection of an approved
investment does not automatically meet the prudent investor standard.”32
The court noted that while individual investors routinely incur investment
advisory fees, “they are not required to consult advisors and [they] suffer
no penalties or potential liability if they act negligently for themselves.”33
Therefore, the court held the investment advisory fees were deductible in
full because the costs were incurred as a result of the trustee’s fiduciary
duty and thus would not have been incurred if the property was not held
in trust.34
Eight years later, the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals, in Mellon Bank,
N.A. v. United States,35 rejected the standard articulated by the Sixth
Circuit in O’Neill36 and focused on interpreting the plain meaning of the
statute.37 In Mellon Bank, the trust originally filed a tax return subjecting
expenses paid for investment advice to the 2% floor of § 67(a), but after
the O’Neill decision sought a refund for taxes paid in excess of the taxes

26. § 67(e)(1). “The second [condition] limits the exemption to a defined class of
administration expenses.” Belcher, supra note 25.
27. 994 F.2d 302 (6th Cir. 1993), abrogated by Knight v. Comm’r, 128 S. Ct. 782 (2008).
28. Id. at 304.
29. Id. at 303.
30. Id. at 304–05.
31. Id. at 304.
32. Id. (citation omitted).
33. O’Neill, 944 F.2d at 304 (emphasis omitted).
34. Id.
35. 265 F.3d 1275 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
36. Id. at 1278; see also O’Neill, 994 F.2d at 304.
37. Mellon Bank, 265 F.3d at 1279–80. The court noted, “[i]n construing the federal income
tax code . . . we are not bound by the fiduciary standards established by state law, and must instead
defer to Congress and the plain meaning of the statute.” Id. at 1280 (citing Comm’r v. Nat’l Alfalfa
Dehydrating & Milling Co., 417 U.S. 134, 148–49 (1974)).
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that would have been paid if the IRS had allowed a full deduction.38 The
Court of Federal Claims interpreted the second condition of § 67(e) to
mean that “a trustee’s costs are subject to the two percent floor . . . unless
the costs occur only in the context of trust administration and are not
routinely incurred by individual investors,” and the Federal Circuit
affirmed.39 In reaching its decision, the Federal Circuit deferred to
Congress and the plain meaning of the statute.40 The court noted that the
first condition of § 67(e) defines “the relationship between the costs and
the administration of the [estate or] trust,”41 and the second condition
“focuses not on the relationship between the trust and costs, but the type
of costs, and whether those costs would have been incurred even if the
assets were not held in a trust.”42 The first condition is satisfied by “[a]ll
expenses resulting from the fiduciary obligations of the trustee . . . .”43 The
court noted that the analysis in O’Neill ends at the first condition.44 If this
interpretation of § 67(e) were proper, the second condition would be
rendered meaningless.45 In contrast, the second requirement acts as a filter
and “treats as fully deductible only those trust-related administrative
expenses that are unique to the administration of a trust and not
customarily incurred outside of trusts.”46 Thus, the Federal Circuit held
that investment advisory fees were costs routinely incurred outside the
context of a trust47 and therefore, were subject to the 2% floor of § 67(a).48

38. Id. at 1277–78.
39. Id. at 1277, 1279.
40. Id. at 1280. The court stated:
We must determine ‘whether the language at issue has a plain and unambiguous
meaning with regard to the particular dispute in the case. Our inquiry must cease
if the statutory language is unambiguous and the statutory scheme is coherent and
consistent. The plainness or ambiguity of statutory language is determined by
reference to the language itself, the specific context in which that language is
used, and the broader context of the statute as a whole.’
Id. (quoting Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 340–41 (1997)).
41. Id.
42. Id. at 1280–81. Therefore, “only those trust-related administrative expenses that are
unique to the administration of a trust and not customarily incurred outside of trusts” are fully
deductible. Id. at 1281.
43. Mellon Bank, 265 F.3d at 1280.
44. See id.
45. Id. The court noted that the interpretation of a statute must give full effect to the entire
statute. Id. (citing Kawaauhau v. Geiger, 523 U.S. 57, 62 (1998)).
46. Id. at 1281.
47. Or put another way, investment advisory fees are costs commonly incurred by
individuals.
48. Mellon Bank, 265 F.3d at 1281–82.
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Similarly, in Scott v. United States,49 the Fourth Circuit Court of
Appeals focused on statutory interpretation to determine the plain meaning
of § 67(e).50 The appointed trustees did not have experience in managing
large assets and refused to serve unless a financial advisor was available
to assist in financial planning for the trust.51 The trustees hired an
investment-counseling firm and deducted in full the firm’s fees.52 The IRS
concluded the fees were subject to the 2% floor of § 67(a) and assessed a
tax deficiency.53 After paying the deficiency and being denied a refund, the
trustees and beneficiaries filed suit in the Eastern District of Virginia.54
The district court concluded that “while the Virginia legal list [of
authorized investments] might not be the best investment[]” in pure
financial terms, the trustees were not under an obligation to seek
investment advice to discharge their fiduciary obligation.55 Accordingly,
by seeking investment advice, the trustee was not doing anything different
from what an individual would do to increase profitability.56 Therefore, the
district court decided the trust’s investment advice fees were subject to the
2% floor of § 67(a).57
The Fourth Circuit, on de novo review, noted the first step in
ascertaining and implementing the intent of Congress “is to determine
whether the statutory language has a plain and unambiguous meaning.”58
The court concluded the “text [of § 67(e)] is clear and unambiguous.”59
Consequently, the court must “give words their ordinary, contemporary,
and common meaning”60 and “[w]here possible, . . . must give effect to
every provision and word in a statute and avoid any interpretation that may
render statutory terms meaningless or superfluous.”61 In interpreting the

49. (Scott II), 328 F.3d 132 (4th Cir. 2003).
50. Id. at 138–39.
51. Scott v. United States (Scott I), 186 F. Supp. 2d 664, 665 (E.D. Va. 2002). The decedent
created a trust providing income to certain beneficiaries with a remainder to others. Id. The trust
instrument “authorized its trustees to employ investment advisors and to pay those advisors
reasonable charges and fees for their services.” Scott II, 328 F.3d at 135.
52. Scott II, 328 F.3d at 135–36.
53. Id. at 136. The trustee paid the deficiency and filed a refund claim arguing the fees were
not subject to the 2% floor. Id. The IRS denied the claim. Id.
54. Id; see also Scott I, 186 F. Supp. 2d at 665.
55. Scott II, 328 F.3d at 137. The district court explained that “under Virginia law, trustees
could fully satisfy their fiduciary duties by limiting themselves to certain investments specifically
authorized by the Virginia legal list.” Id.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 138–39.
59. Id. at 139.
60. Id. (citing Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 420, 431 (2000); United States v. Maxwell, 285
F.3d 336, 340–41 (4th Cir. 2002); United States v. Lehman, 225 F.3d 426, 428–29 (4th Cir. 2000)).
61. Scott II, 328 F.3d at 139 (citing Freytag v. Comm’r, 501 U.S. 868, 877 (1991)).
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meaning of “would” in the context of the second condition of § 67(e)(1),62
the court found it “expresses concepts such as custom, habit, natural
disposition, or probability.”63 Additionally, the court found investmentadvice fees “are often incurred by individual taxpayers in the management
of income-producing property not held in trust.”64 Therefore, the court held
that investment advisory fees are trust-related administrative expenses
subject to the 2% floor because they constitute expenses commonly
incurred by individual taxpayers.65
In the instant case, the Court first analyzed the language of the statute.66
Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr., writing for an unanimous court, laid out
the general rule of § 67(e)67 and the exception provided in § 67(e)(1).68 The
Court of Appeals applied § 67(e) by asking “whether the cost at issue
could have been incurred by an individual.”69 The Court rejected this
approach stating it “flies in the face of the statutory language.”70 The Court
noted “[i]f Congress had intended the Court of Appeals’ reading, it easily
could have replaced ‘would’ in the statute with ‘could,’ and presumably
would have.”71 Additionally, the Court recognized that if the Court of
Appeals’ reading were correct, then the first condition72 would be
62. The second condition of § 67(e)(1) states the cost must be one “which would not have
been incurred if the property were not held in such trust or estate.” I.R.C. § 67(e)(1) (2000)
(emphasis added).
63. Scott II, 328 F.3d at 139 (citing WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY
481 (1976); AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 2042, 2059 (3d ed.
1992)).
64. Id. at 140.
65. Id. at 139–40. The court noted that by holding a trust’s investment advisory fees as fully
deductible, the court would render the second condition of § 67(e)(1) meaningless. Id. at 140.
Therefore, to give effect to the second condition, the court must hold that the investment-advice
fees do not qualify for the § 67(e) exception. Id. The court concluded by stating the reasoning in
O’Neill “contain[ed] a fatal flaw.” Id. Since the fees may be caused by the fiduciary duties of the
trust, they are costs commonly incurred in the administration of a trust. See id. But the second
condition “asks whether [the] costs are commonly incurred outside the administration of trusts.”
Id. (emphasis omitted). Therefore, because investment advisory fees are commonly incurred outside
the administration of trusts, they are subject to the 2% floor of § 67(a). Id.
66. Knight v. Comm’r, 128 S. Ct. 782, 787 (2008).
67. “‘[T]he adjusted gross income of [a] . . . trust shall be computed in the same manner as
in the case of an individual.’” Id. (quoting § 67(e)). The general rule means “trusts can ordinarily
deduct costs subject to the same 2% floor that applies to individuals’ deductions.” Id.
68. The exception to the 2% floor applies when two conditions are met. “First, the relevant
cost must be ‘paid or incurred in connection with the administration of the . . . trust.’” Id. (quoting
§ 67(e)(1)). “Second, the cost must be one ‘which would not have been incurred if the property
were not held in such trust.’” Id. (quoting § 67(e)(1)).
69. Id.
70. Id. The statute asks whether the costs “would not have been incurred if the property were
not held” in trust, not whether the costs “could not have been incurred.” Id.
71. Id.
72. The first condition is the costs must be “paid or incurred in connection with the
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meaningless because
[i]f the only costs that are fully deductible are those that could
not be incurred outside the trust context—that is, that could
only be incurred by trusts—then there would be no reason to
place the further condition on full deductibility that the costs
be ‘paid or incurred in connection with the administration of
the . . . trust.’73
Rendering part of a statute entirely superfluous is something the Court is
“‘loath to do.’”74
Additionally, the Court acknowledged that in interpreting provisions
“‘in which a general statement of policy is qualified by an exception, [the
Court must] read the exception narrowly in order to preserve the primary
operation of the provision.’”75 The general rule of § 67(e) subjects estates
and trusts to the 2% floor established in § 67(a).76 However, if the Court
were to adopt the fiduciary-duty standard articulated by the Sixth Circuit
in O’Neill,77 then “most (if not all) expenses incurred by a trust would be
fully deductible” and the general rule would be swallowed by the
exception.78 Therefore, the Court rejected this interpretation.79
Instead, the Court adopted the standard articulated by the Fourth80 and
Federal Circuits.81 The Court found “the word ‘would’ is best read as
‘express[ing] concepts such as custom, habit, natural disposition, or
probability.’”82 Accordingly, based on the “direct import of the language
in context,” the statute asks “whether expenses are ‘customarily’ incurred
outside of trusts.”83 The Court acknowledged that “what is common may
administration of the . . . trust.” See § 67(e)(1).
73. Knight, 128 S. Ct. at 788 (quoting § 67(e)(1)). The Court could not think of an “expense
that could be incurred exclusively by a trust but would nevertheless not be ‘paid or incurred in
connection with’ its administration.” Id. (quoting § 67(e)(1)).
74. Id. at 789 (quoting Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Aviall Servs., Inc., 543 U.S. 157, 166 (2004)).
75. Id. (quoting Comm’r v. Clark, 489 U.S. 726, 739 (1989)).
76. See § 67(e); Knight, 128 S. Ct at 787.
77. See O’Neill v. Comm’r, 994 F.2d 302, 304 (6th Cir. 1993), abrogated by Knight v.
Comm’r, 128 S. Ct. 782 (2008).
78. Knight, 128 S. Ct. at 789.
79. Id.
80. See Scott v. United States (Scott II), 328 F.3d 132 (4th Cir. 2003); supra notes 49–65 and
accompanying text. “Put simply, trust-related administrative expenses are subject to the 2% floor
if they constitute expenses commonly incurred by individual taxpayers.” Scott II, 328 F.3d at 140.
81. Knight, 128 S. Ct. at 789; see Mellon Bank, N.A. v. United States, 265 F.3d 1275 (Fed.
Cir. 2001); supra notes 35–48 and accompanying text. Section 67(e) “treats as fully deductible only
those trust-related administrative expenses that are unique to the administration of a trust and not
customarily incurred outside of trusts.” Mellon Bank, 265 F.3d at 1281.
82. Knight, 128 S. Ct. at 789 (alteration in original) (quoting Scott II, 328 F.3d at 139).
83. Id.
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not be as easy [to determine] in [all] cases,” but recognized “that is no
excuse for judicial amendment of the statute.”84 Therefore, the Court held
that “§ 67(e)(1) excepts from the 2% floor only those costs that it would
be uncommon (or unusual, or unlikely) for . . a hypothetical individual to
incur.”85
Applying this rule to the facts of the case, the Court found “[i]t is not
uncommon or unusual for individuals to hire an investment adviser.”86 The
Court noted the burden of establishing entitlement to a deduction is on the
trustee87 and the trustee failed to demonstrate such entitlement.88 The
trustee’s argument was that he “engaged an investment adviser because of
his fiduciary duties” to act as a prudent investor.89 To satisfy the prudent
investor standard, the trustee “must ‘invest and manage trust assets as a
prudent investor would, by considering the purposes, terms, distribution
requirements and other circumstances of the trust.’”90 The standard looks
to “what a prudent investor with the same investment objectives handling
his own affairs would do.”91 The Court did not doubt that an individual
investor in the trustee’s position would have sought investment advice.92
Therefore, the Court noted:
it [would be] quite difficult to say that investment advisory
fees ‘would not have been incurred’—that is, that it would be
unusual or uncommon for such fees to have been incurred—if
the property were held by an individual investor with the
same objectives as the Trust in handling his own affairs.93
However, in the final paragraph of the Court’s opinion,94 the Court
acknowledged “some trust-related investment advisory fees may be fully
deductible ‘if an investment advisor were to impose a special, additional

84. Id. at 791. The Court draws on the Code’s use of “ordinary” as an example of other
situations where uncertainty is tolerated. Id. (citing Deputy v. du Pont, 308 U.S. 488, 495 (1940)
(noting that “[o]rdinary has the connotation of normal, usual, or customary”)). See also Welch v.
Helvering, 290 U.S. 111, 115 (1933) (“Life in all its fullness must supply the answer to the
riddle.”).
85. Knight, 128 S. Ct. at 790.
86. Id.
87. Id. (citing INDOPCO, Inc. v. Comm’r, 503 U.S. 79, 84 (1992)).
88. Id. The Court stated the trustee argued “that individuals cannot incur trust investment
advisory fees, not that individuals do not commonly incur investment advisory fees.” Id.
89. Id.
90. Knight, 128 S. Ct. at 790 (quoting CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 45a–541b(a) (West 2008)).
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 790–91.
94. This paragraph could be considered dicta.
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charge applicable only to its fiduciary accounts.’”95 The Court reasoned
“that a trust may have an unusual investment objective, or may require a
specialized balancing of the interests of various parties, such that a
reasonable comparison with individual investors would be improper.”96 In
such a case, the Court stated “the incremental cost of expert advice beyond
what would normally be required for the ordinary taxpayer would not be
subject to the 2% floor.”97 Regarding the instant case, the Court found
nothing in the record supported a finding that the investment firm charged
the trustee more than an individual with similar objectives, and the trust
did not assert that its investment objective or balancing of competing
interests was distinctive.98 Therefore, the Court concluded “the investment
advisory fees incurred by the Trust [were] subject to the 2% floor.”99
By adopting the Fourth and Federal Circuits’ interpretation of the
second condition of § 67(e)(1),100 the Court has added to the confusion
surrounding the exception, rather than clarifying its application. By
focusing the inquiry on what expenses are “uncommon (or unusual, or
unlikely) for . . . a hypothetical individual to incur,”101 it is unclear which
expenses will qualify for the exception and which expenses will not. While
this standard is not as restrictive as the Second Circuit’s interpretation,102
its application is more difficult and burdensome. The Court’s standard
does not develop a bright line test subjecting all investment advisory fees
to the 2% floor. Rather, only those fees that are “commonly incurred by
individuals” are subject to the floor. During oral argument, the Court
struggled with how the “commonly incurred” language would be applied
to determine the deductibility of other expenses.103 Based on the lack of

95. Knight, 128 S. Ct. at 791 (quoting Brief for the Respondent at 25, Knight v. Comm’r, No.
06-1286 (U.S., Oct. 11, 2007)).
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id. The Court affirmed the judgment of the Court of Appeals but for different reasons.
Id. at 785.
100. The Court interpreted the second condition of § 67(e)(1) to mean “§ 67(e)(1) excepts
from the 2% floor only those costs that it would be uncommon (or unusual, or unlikely) for . . . a
hypothetical individual to incur.” See supra note 85 and accompanying text.
101. See supra note 85 and accompanying text.
102. See supra note 69 and accompanying text. By interpreting the second condition as
exempting those costs that “could not be incurred by individuals,” the Second Circuit was
restricting the application of the exception to only those costs that individuals are incapable of
incurring. However, the interpretation adopted by the Supreme Court is more expansive and allows
full deductibility for expenses that are uncommon or unlikely for individuals to incur.
103. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 39–40, Knight, 128 S. Ct. 782 (No. 06-1286). The
following is an excerpt from oral arguments of a discussion between Chief Justice Roberts and Eric
D. Miller, Esq., an assistant to the Solicitor General, who represented the I.R.S.:
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certainty in this standard, there is room to argue that certain fees incurred
by a trust were for specialized services104 that are not commonly incurred
by individuals. In such a situation, the dicta in the last paragraph of the
Court’s decision may require the trustee to bifurcate the fee into fees
commonly incurred by individuals and fees not commonly incurred by
individuals. This potential requirement, created by the dicta of the opinion,
adds even more confusion to an already confusing standard: Those fees
attributable to services that are common for individuals are subject to the
2% floor of § 67(a), while those fees attributable to specialized services for

CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: So how does your customary or commonly incurred
test work? Let’s say you have two trusts, one $10 million, the other [$]10,000. I
think an individual with $10 million might well seek investment advice, but an
individual with only [$]10,000 might decide it’s not worth it. Would you have a
different application of the 2 percent rule for those two trusts?
MR. MILLER: I think if the test is whether—whether the individuals would
have—would commonly ordinarily incur that cost, I think one might well look at
that because the comparison would be individuals with similar assets, and, as
Your Honor knows, there might be a difference depending on the size.
CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: How many—how many individuals do you need?
Let’s say it’s $3 million in the trust, and we think maybe 60 percent of people
would hire an investment advisor; 40 percent would think they can do just as well
on their own. Is that customarily incurred by individuals?
MR. MILLER: I think it might well be enough that—for something that the
Service could clarify through—
CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Your answer to both questions is “might well be,”
and that’s a fairly vague line when it comes to taxes.
MR. MILLER: The—
JUSTICE SCALIA: And whatever line you—you pick, I guarantee you, trusts are
going to break themselves up into mini-trusts that fall under the line. I mean
people aren’t stupid.
(Laughter.)
CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Or, even worse, advisors are going to break
themselves up into different advisors. There’s going to be somebody who says I’m
a fiduciary advisor whenever a trustee calls, but, I’m a normal advisor, when it’s
an individual.
See id.
104. For example, if the trust has an unusual investment objective or required balancing of
interests of various parties (i.e. a life beneficiary versus a remainder beneficiary), then these efforts
could be specialized services not commonly incurred by individuals.
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the trust and not common for individuals are not subject to the 2% floor
and are fully deductible by the trust. This standard leaves much to be
desired. It suggests that financial advisors have the burden of tracking and
separating fees into categories of those common for individuals and those
that are not. Whether the IRS will respect the advisor’s bifurcation of fees
remains unclear.
Additionally, the burden placed on financial advisors to bifurcate fees
and the uncertainty of what expenses are “commonly incurred by
individuals” conflicts with the goal of § 67.105 Congress enacted § 67 to
reduce (1) the complexity; (2) the need for extensive taxpayer
recordkeeping; and (3) the significant administrative and enforcement
problems of the IRS.106 The standard articulated by the Court increases,
rather than reduces, the complexity and the need for extensive
recordkeeping, and causes administrative and enforcement problems for
the IRS. Without further guidance as to how the Court’s standard will be
applied, the goal of § 67 is compromised.107
Additionally, the IRS’s proposed regulations provide little guidance
as to the application of the Court’s standard. 1 0 8 The

105. See § 67 (2000).
106. Knight v. Comm’r, 128 S. Ct. 782, 785 (2008) (citing H.R. Rep. No. 99-426, 99th Cong.
(1985)).
107. Although the following goes beyond the scope of this Comment, I thought it necessary
to bring to light an important argument against the constitutionality of the 2% floor. According to
the Court, taxable income is an “undeniable accession[] to wealth.” See Comm’r v. Glenshaw Glass
Co., 348 U.S. 426, 431 (1955). A gain-seeking deduction, such as an investment fee, reduces a
taxpayer’s net accession to wealth. While the Sixteenth Amendment grants Congress the “power
to lay and collect taxes on incomes, from whatever source derived,” the “incomes” upon which
Congress may “lay and collect taxes” is the taxpayer’s net accession to wealth; a taxpayer’s return
above gain-seeking expenses. See U.S. CONST. amend XVI.; see Comm’r v. Meyer, 139 F.2d 256,
258–59 (6th Cir. 1943) (“It is generally accepted that a return of capital or investment is not taxable
under the Sixteenth Amendment.”); United States v. Safety Car Heating & Lighting Co., 297 U.S.
88, 99 (1936) (“[I]t is income as the word is known in the common speech of men.”); Boris I.
Bittker & Lawrence Lokken, Federal Taxation of Income, Estates and Gifts ¶ 5.1 (3d ed.1999)
(stating “income” is determined by looking at “common usage, accounting concepts, administrative
goals, and finally, judicial reaction to these forces”). Therefore, limiting a gain-seeking deduction
to a 2% floor, as in § 67(a), allows Congress to tax more than the taxpayer’s net accession to
wealth. However, having a 2% limitation on deductions that are not gain-seeking deductions is
probably not unconstitutional because such deductions do not affect a taxpayer’s net accession to
wealth. The argument is that imposing a limit on the deductibility of gain-seeking expenses is
unconstitutional. Interview with Daniel Glassman, Esq., Graduate Tax Student, Univ. of Fla., in
Gainesville, Fla. (Mar. 5, 2008).
108. One month after the Supreme Court granted certiorari, the IRS issued proposed
regulations adopting the approach of the Second Circuit. See Belcher, supra note 25, at 172. The
proposed regulations were issued on July 26, 2007, and certiorari was granted June 25, 2007. See
id. at 172, 181; see also Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.67-4, 72 Fed. Reg. 41243, 41244 (July 27, 2007);
Internal Revenue Bulletin No. 2007-36, available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-irbs/irb07-36.pdf.
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proposed regulations adopt the approach of the Second Circuit and focus
on whether an individual “could not have incurred that cost.”109 Because
such an interpretation “flies in the face of the statutory language
[of § 67(e)],”110 trustees cannot use the proposed regulations to determine
whether an expense satisfies the § 67(e) exception. Moreover, there is
concern that the IRS is not reconsidering the proposed regulations in light

109. See Explanation of Provisions, REG-128224-06, available at http://www.irs.gov/irb/20
07-36_IRB/ar24.html.
110. See supra note 70 and accompanying text. The excerpt below, from the transcript of oral
arguments, shows the Court’s lack of enthusiasm toward the Second Circuit’s interpretation:
JUSTICE SCALIA: Anything that could not be done of course would not be done.
But that doesn’t mean that the—that the two words mean the same thing.
MR. MILLER: But—
JUSTICE SCALIA: It’s true that one is included within the other, but they don’t
mean the same thing.
MR. MILLER: Would—I think that the unadorned use of the word “would”
here—
JUSTICE SCALIA: What could not happen would not happen, of course. But it
doesn’t mean that—the two concepts are not the same.
MR. MILLER: I think, when—when you have the word “would,” as we have in
this statute, that’s not qualified in any way, it’s ambiguous in the sense that it can
mean definitely would not have been incurred, probably would not have been
incurred, customarily, ordinarily would not have been incurred, which is the
meaning—
CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: You didn’t think much of this argument before the
Second Circuit adopted it, did you? You didn’t argue this before the Court of
Appeals?
(Laughter.)
MR. MILLER: We did not argue it before—
CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: So you have a fallback argument.
MR. MILLER: Well, that—that’s right.
CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Well, now might be a good time to fall back.
(Laughter.)
See Transcript of Oral Argument at 28–29, Knight, 128 S. Ct. 782 (No. 06-1286).
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of the Court’s decision.111 After the Court’s decision, the IRS issued
Notice 2008-32112 clarifying how taxpayers should report bundled trust
expenses on their 2007 returns.113 However, the Court’s decision did not
make any reference to bundled or unbundled expenses.114 The proposed
regulations, as written, have no relation to the standard articulated by the
Court. Therefore, to provide clarity to taxpayers, the IRS should issue a
new set of proposed regulations based on the language of Knight and
should allow sufficient time for comments.115
Furthermore, the articulated standard, as it applies to the deductibility
of trust expenses, could have additional implications. In the past, courts
have unanimously agreed that tax preparation fees incurred by a trust are
fully deductible.116 However, tax preparation fees are fees “commonly
incurred by individuals,”117 and therefore, according to the Court’s
111. See Jeremiah Coder, IRS Releases Interim Guidance on Bundled Trust Fees, TaxAnalysts,
Feb. 28, 2008, at 2008 TNT 40-2.
112. I.R.S. Notice 2008-32, 2008-3 I.R.B. 279. The I.R.S. issued the notice on Mar. 17, 2008.
Id.
113. Id.; see also IRS Issues Interim Guidance on Trust Fees Subject to 2 Percent Floor,
TaxAnalysts, Feb. 27, 2008, at 2008 TNT 40-9.
114. The proposed regulations refer to bundled regulations to describe the situation where “an
estate or a non-grantor trust pays a single fee, commission or other expense for both costs that are
unique to estates and trusts and costs that are not.” See Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.67-4, 72 Fed. Reg.
41243, 41245 (July 27, 2007). The bundled expenses refer primarily to the situation where a trustee
is paid a single fee but the fee includes the trustee’s services as trustee and as an investment
advisor. See Steve R. Akers, 2008 Early Winter Musings: Estate Planning Hot Topics and Current
Developments 36 (Jan. 7, 2008), http://www.abanet.org/rpte/publications/ereport/2008/1/Akers_
EarlyWinter.pdf. Such an unbundling requirement would create a “substantial additional
administrative requirement in the form of recordkeeping for every trust and estate.” See Belcher,
supra note 25 at 189. Additionally, because such “unbundling has never been an industry practice,
there is valid concern among corporate trustees that being forced to do so will have an adverse
business impact because it will open the door to more ‘a la carte’ fee negotiations with beneficiaries
or other interested parties.” Letter from Jeffrey R. Hoops to the Treasury Department, in AICPA
Asks Treasury to Withdraw Proposed 2 Percent Floor Regs in Light of Recent Supreme Court
Decision, TaxAnalysts, Feb. 8, 2008, at 2008 TNT 29-17.
115. See Coder, supra note 111.
116. O’Neill found that investment advisory fees were fully deductible because of the trustee’s
fiduciary duties. See O’Neill v. Comm’r, 994 F.2d 302, 304 (6th Cir. 1993); see also Mellon Bank,
N.A. v. United States, 265 F.3d 1275, 1279 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (stating “[i]t is undisputed that trustee
fees are fully deductible”). Therefore, presumably the O’Neill court would agree that tax
preparation fees are fully deductible because they relate to the fulfillment of the fiduciary’s duties.
117. Arguably the only distinction between fiduciary and individual tax preparation fees
relates to the form that is filled out. Trusts file a Form 1041 and Schedule K-1, whereas individuals
file a Form 1040. However, some may argue that tax preparation fees are different from investment
advisory fees because there is no way to shift the expenses of tax preparation from an individual
to a trust. Individuals incur tax preparation fees and such fees are subject to the 2% floor.
Additionally, if an individual puts property into a trust, the individual still has to incur tax
preparation fees and so does the trust. Therefore, because there is no shift, there is justification for
treating tax preparation fees as fully deductible by trusts. However, the counter argument is that
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standard, they would be subject to the 2% floor of § 67(a).118 This result
would contradict the unanimous agreement among courts that such fees are
fully deductible by trusts.119 Because the Court’s standard does not discuss
the impact of the standard on tax preparation fees, it seems that the opinion
will not affect the full deductibility of trust tax preparation fees. However,
if the Court’s standard can be interpreted to subject trust tax preparation
fees to the 2% floor, then this injects uncertainty into the applicability of
the standard to other questions of deductibility.
However, if the Court had followed the standard articulated by the
Sixth Circuit, all expenses incurred by a trust as a result of the trustee’s
fiduciary duty would be fully deductible under § 67(e).120 Although this
interpretation would have created a bright-line test for applying § 67(e),
this standard would render the second condition of § 67(e) meaningless.121
As the Court pointed out, rendering part of a statute superfluous is
something courts are “loath to do.”122 The statute exempts a deduction
from the 2% floor only if the expense is incurred in connection with the

IRC § 641(b) requires the taxable income of an estate or trust be computed in the same manner as
in the case of an individual. Therefore, while there is no shift of the burden of paying fees for tax
preparation, the law requires that a trust be treated as an individual. Therefore, if an individual is
required to have tax preparation fees subject to the 2% floor, so too should a trust. Interview with
Daniel Glassman, Esq., Graduate Tax Student, Univ. of Fla., in Gainesville, Fla. (Mar. 21, 2008);
Interview with Kristeen Witt, Esq., Graduate Tax Student, Univ. of Fla., in Gainesville, Fla. (Mar.
22, 2008).
118. The Court questioned the validity of the distinction between trust and individual tax
preparations fees in oral argument, but did not address the issue in its opinion. See Knight, 128 S.
Ct. 782 (2008). The following is an excerpt from oral arguments in which Justice David H. Souter
addressed attorney Eric D. Miller, an assistant to the Solicitor General, who represented the I.R.S.:
JUSTICE SOUTER: Yes, but it’s the individual who has to file the 1040. What
the trustee is filing is the 1041. And—and why do you place—I was going to ask
the same question that Justice Alito did, and that is why do you place so much
significance either in the label, i.e., it’s fiduciary return, or in the peculiar fact that
it is a fiduciary who is filing that return?
It’s a tax return and—and I think your—the government’s argument is that
with respect to—to other items that may be disputed, you should regard them at
a fairly general level, i.e., investment advice, not fiduciary investment advice. But
when you come to the tax return, you don’t regard it as a general—at a general
level; you regard it at a very specific level, i.e., a fiduciary tax return. It seems to
me that the government with respect to the tax return is doing exactly what it
criticizes the taxpayer for doing with respect to investment advice. And I don’t
understand the distinction.
See Transcript of Oral Argument at 31–32, Knight, 128 S. Ct. 782 (No. 06-1286).
119. See supra note 116 and accompanying text.
120. See supra notes 27–34 and accompanying text.
121. See supra notes 41–48 and accompanying text.
122. See supra note 74 and accompanying text.
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trust and would not have been incurred by an individual.123 To satisfy the
intent of the statute, both conditions must be given effect. Additionally, if
§ 67(e) was interpreted to exempt all expenses incurred by a trust from the
2% limitation, the exception would swallow the general rule subjecting
estates and trusts to the 2% floor.124 If the intent of § 67(e) were to exempt
from the 2% floor all costs associated with trust administration, then rather
than using the complicated language seen in § 67(e), the provision would
have been drafted similar to § 68(e)—“This section shall not apply to any
estate or trust.”125 This simple statement would have exempted from the
2% floor expenses incurred in the administration of a trust. Because such
a simple statement was not used, the intent of § 67(e) must not have been
to exempt from the 2% floor all expenses incurred by a trust. Therefore,
the Court correctly rejected this standard as the appropriate interpretation
of § 67(e).126
An alternative solution is to recognize investment advisory fees as
capital expenditures that are required to be capitalized under § 263,127
instead of deducted under § 212.128 This suggestion was not considered by
either party or the Court. Under § 263, expenses should be capitalized if
they are used to “increase the value of any property or estate.”129 Arguably,
investment advisory fees are paid to increase the value of the estate
through the investment of estate assets. Having determined that § 263

123. I.R.C. § 67(e)(1) (2000).
124. See supra note 78 and accompanying text.
125. § 68(e).
126. However, although beyond the scope of this Comment, it could be argued that Congress
should amend § 67(e) to make § 67(a) not apply to estates and trusts. This would conform § 67(e)
with § 68(e). While it has been stated that the purpose of § 67(e) is to “make the tax laws more fair
by preventing wealthy and sophisticated taxpayers from using tax shelters or trusts to gain tax
benefits unavailable to other individuals,” it does not make sense for taxpayers to put property into
a trust simply to avoid the 2% floor of § 67(a). See Mellon Bank, N.A. v. United States, 47 Fed. Cl.
186, 193 (2000); see also William A. Drennan, The Patented Loophole: How Should Congress
Respond to this Judicial Invention?, 59 FLA. L. REV. 229, 280 (2007) (stating one of the goals of
tax policy is “horizontal equity—the notion that similarly situated taxpayers should pay similar
taxes”). The costs associated with the administration of a trust can be significant and the tax
generated by income to a trust can be greater than it would be if the property were held by an
individual. See §§ 1(a)–(d), (e), (i) (indicating that the highest tax bracket for a trust is $7,500 at
35% as opposed to the highest tax bracket for an individual is $250,000 at 35%). Therefore,
because it is unlikely that individuals will put property into a trust in order to avoid the 2% floor,
maybe Congress should consider amending § 67(e) to exempt estates and trusts from § 67(a).
127. § 263 (stating the general rule for capital expenditures).
128. § 212 (stating the deduction rule for expenses for the production of income). Beyond the
issue of whether § 67(a) or § 67(e) applies to investment advisory fees, the question remains
whether the fees were ever really deductible under § 212. If § 263 applies, the fees paid for
investment advice should never have been deductible under § 212 and therefore § 67 is irrelevant.
See infra note 134 and accompanying text.
129. § 263(a)(1).
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applies, a deduction under § 212 is prohibited in the computation of
taxable income under § 63.130 While most investors would prefer to have
a current deduction for the expense under § 212 rather than an offset on the
amount of gain recognized in the future,131 requiring that the expense be
capitalized reduces the confusion associated with § 67(e), provides
certainty to taxpayers and trustees, and eliminates the need for extensive
recordkeeping.132 Therefore, a possible solution is to recognize that the
amounts paid for investment advice must be capitalized and may not be
deducted.133 If the investment advisory fees are capitalized, § 67(e) is
irrelevant because it only relates to deductions. Capitalizing the expense
would create a bright-line rule that is easy to apply.
Nonetheless, while the Court needed to resolve the conflict among the
circuit courts, the standard it articulated has created more confusion than
clarification. The Court’s decision to interpret § 67(e) as requiring not only
a determination of what expenses are “commonly incurred by individuals,”
but also a bifurcation of expenses, has developed a complex standard that
involves extensive recordkeeping and creates difficulty in administration.
Such complexity contradicts the goal of § 67. To reduce the complexity
and the burden placed on taxpayers, the IRS should provide guidance by
issuing new proposed regulations consistent with the Court’s analysis.
Further, if, after reviewing the Court’s analysis, Congress does not think
the Court correctly interpreted its intent, then Congress may change the
130. Section 211 provides: “In computing taxable income under section 63, there shall be
allowed as deductions the items specified in this part, subject to the exceptions provided in part IX
(section 261 and following, relating to items not deductible).” Section 212 provides:
In the case of an individual, there shall be allowed as a deduction all the ordinary
and necessary expenses paid or incurred during the taxable year—(1) for the
production or collection of income; (2) for the management, conservation, or
maintenance of property held for the production of income; or (3) in connection
with the determination, collection, or refund of any tax.
Investment advisory fees are expenses incurred for the production of income and therefore, § 212
applies. However, § 261 in Part IX provides: “In computing taxable income no deduction shall in
any case be allowed in respect of the items specified in this part.” And § 263 provides: “No
deduction shall be allowed for—(1) Any amount paid out for . . . betterments made to increase the
value of any property or estate.” Therefore, because investment advisory fees are paid out to
increase the value of property, § 263 prohibits a deduction under § 212 and requires the expense
be capitalized.
131. Such a preference reflects the time value of money.
132. Requiring capitalization of the fee would also solve the possible constitutional problem.
See supra note 107.
133. Note that the capitalization of investment advisory fees would apply to trusts and
individuals and not just to trusts. Therefore, individuals would be required to capitalize the expense
rather than deduct it subject to the 2% floor. Because the capitalization requirement would apply
equally to trusts and individuals, there would be no benefit for putting the property in a trust.
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language of § 67(e) to express the correct standard. Until then, the Court’s
vague and unworkable standard—a test whose flaws Chief Justice Roberts
seemed to envision134—is destined to create more problems than it solves.

134. See supra note 103.
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